The principles-based UK regulatory framework for auditor independence (ICAEW 2001 ), adopted in 1997, identifies threats to both to independence in fact and in appearance and the safeguards which control these threats. These principles are incorporated in the IFAC (2001) 
INTRODUCTION
Independent audit of company financial statements is a key component of the regulatory framework which supports capital markets. Concerns are often expressed by regulators and other observers as to whether auditors are sufficiently independent and competent, particularly in the aftermath of corporate failures or material changes to previously approved audited accounts. The restatement of the Enron accounts and the collapse of Andersen following the obstruction of justice finding against the firm (SEC 2002) shows the devastating effect of loss of confidence in the integrity of an audit firm. Despite the lack of knowledge about independence in fact, Enron has severely compromised independence in appearance. Failure by auditors to identify and report on misleading financial information undermines the economic value of audit, which is damaging to all firms in the long run. Concerns have also been expressed about aggressive earnings management practices (Levitt 1998; APB 2001) . However the most serious concern for regulators is that audit failures can also undermine the stability of the capital markets if users lose faith in the audit process.
Failure by auditors to detect a material error or misstatement in accounting information can arise from three main causes, two of which may be attributed to audit failure (Hall and Renner 1991) . First, auditors may either fail to detect a material error or misstatement, or, having detected an error, fail to recognise it, because they have carried out a substandard audit, i.e. the auditors are incompetent. Second, auditors may identify a material error or misstatement and fail to report it or fail to persuade the directors to put it right, i.e. the auditors lack independence. Third, directors may deliberately deceive auditors. In cases of deliberate deception, auditors may not be held responsible for failure to detect a problem.
A key problem for both regulators and standard setters is that the audit process itself is unobservable. Only the participants in the process, i.e. auditors and the company management, know how decisions are reached. Because the process is unobservable , the regulatory framework which sets out requirements both for competence and independence of auditors must not only be effective as a working model for auditors to adhere to, it must also be capable of convincing those who rely on the audit service that they are adequately protected by the framework against auditors who are incompetent or who lack independence. For audit to retain its value to capital markets, the framework must be seen to protect the appearance of integrity in the audit process as well as the fact of it.
The difficulties of gaining access to real-life settings have also made it difficult for independent researchers to access information about competence and independence in fact (Dye 1991) . Thus, the only publicly available evidence of auditors' actual performance arises from cases where audits have failed. As a consequence, research has concentrated on surveying perceptions about audit, i.e. independence in appearance (see, for example Bartlett (1997) in the US and Beattie et al. (1999) in the UK). More recently, researchers in the US have begun to carry out experimental studies that examine the influence on auditors' behaviour of a range of factors. These factors are of four types:
individual characteristics, within-firm factors, client company factors and regulatory factors. See, for example, Shafer et al. (1999 Shafer et al. ( , 2001 , DeZoort and Lord (1997) , King (2002) , Lord and DeZoort (2001) , Thorne and Hardwick (2001) and Trompeter (1994) .
There are also a few recent studies that seek direct evidence of auditors' behaviour from real-life settings, using a questionnaire approach. The focus of these studies is auditor-client interactions generally, in particular the process of negotiation and the factors that influence the outcome (see Gibbins et al. (1999) and Nelson et al. (2002) in the US, and Beattie et al. (2000) in the UK). (Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt, 2001) exceptionally uses a detailed case study approach to analyse six real cases covering 22 audit interactions between finance directors (FDs) and audit engagement partners (AEPs). The overall objective of the study was to develop a grounded theory to explain what key factors influence the decision-making process when an auditor is confronted with difficult and contentious accounting issues. The cases were identified from the previous questionnaire study (Beattie et al., 2000) in which respondents were asked whether they were willing to be interviewed. Six FDs who indicated high levels of negotiation and discussion agreed to be interviewed and gave permission for their audit engagement partner to be interviewed, with the consent of the audit firm. The less litigious environment in the UK, compared to the US, makes research of this nature still possible.
The recent book Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is really About
The cornerstone of the process by which auditors decide on the scope of their work has been an internationally recognised risk model, which is incorporated into auditing standards e.g. in the UK in SAS 300 (APB 1995) . This model enables the auditor to determine the scope of audit testing for error or misstatement in each client company by assessing the risk of error or misstatement arising in that company. In recent years, doubts have been expressed as to whether some of the current approaches to audit risk assessment adopted by large firms are fully compatible with the generally accepted risk model (Lemon et al. 2000) . The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board is revising its approach to audit risk and has recently issued exposure drafts on audit risk (IFAC 2002) .
Concerns about the risk model have been paralleled by recent concerns about auditor independence, which started to emerge from the SEC (Levitt 1998) Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About (hereafter BCD) provides an analysis of six company case studies which show how accounting issues which arise during the audit process are resolved between audit engagement partners (AEPs) and finance directors (FDs). From these cases, audit quality is shown to be an holistic activity in which issues of competence, independence in fact and audit risk are inextricably linked. In this paper, we specifically explore risk and independence. Under current frameworks, independence and risk are regarded as separate issues. In UK standards, auditor independence is not factored into the audit risk model but appears in the profession's ethical guide. More recently, the independence frameworks issued by the EC (2001), elements of which have been adopted in the UK, and IFAC (2001) do not refer to the audit risk model. We argue that the regulatory framework should reflect the fact that risk and independence are linked. In this paper, we draw on the findings in BCD and we both reconceptualise the audit risk model and re-examine the threats and safeguards in the UK and IFAC independence frameworks. In reconsidering the relationship between independence in fact and audit risk we are able to identify more clearly where the key audit risks and threats to independence really lie. We also consider how independence in appearance fits into the framework. The paper can be seen as responding to calls by the Public Oversight Board's Panel on Audit Effectiveness to 'enhance' the audit model (POB 2000) .
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Part two is a review of relevant literature, both academic and professional. In part three we review the UK and IFAC independence frameworks. In part four, the main part of the paper, we analyse and discuss the interactions identified in BCD we consider the interactions identified in BCD in relation to the provisions of the UK and IFAC independence frameworks. In part five we consider the implications of this analysis for the audit risk model. Part six presents the conclusions.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Audit risk and auditor independence
The established audit risk model in SAS 300 identifies the overall audit risk. This is defined as the auditor giving 'an inappropriate audit opinion on financial statements' (APB 1995 Figure 1 .
Figure 1 about here
Some audit firms have refocused the way they assess risk and this has led to questioning as to whether the risk model as set out in the standards still holds. Lemon et al. (2000) review audit methodologies in large firms. They identify that some large firms are adopting what is called a business risk approach which replaces the combination of inherent risk and control risk. Business risk is defined as: 'the risk that the audited entity will fail to achieve its objectives'. Business risk is therefore more closely aligned to the objectives of the business than those of financial statement audit. The audit process then narrows down the business risk assessment to focus on risks of material misstatement in the financial statements. This approach is seen as adding value to audit as it is may help management to improve business performance and manage their own risks (Eilifsen et al. 2002 ) but it does not change the overall audit risk. Jeppeson (1998) suggests that one effect of the big firms making efforts to differentiate themselves and add value to audit by adopting the business risk assessment process is that they become more closely identified with the objectives of management, and they consequently risk compromising their independence. However some counter balance may be provided as, by using this approach, the auditor acquires a better knowledge and understanding of the business. Power (2000) continues this argument by suggesting that much greater responsibility for compliance is being forced onto the company through regulatory initiatives, particularly the developments in corporate governance requirements and risk management. If the role of the auditor becomes one of involvement in the design of compliance systems within the company, then independence from the company may become more difficult to achieve. This issue emerges as one of the factors for which Andersen were criticised in the Waste Management case (SEC 2001).
Over many years, practitioners and academics have struggled to find definitions for independence in the audit context. Perhaps the best known definition in the academic literature is that of De Angelo (1981, 186) 'the conditional probability of reporting a discovered breach'. Others include: 'the ability to resist client pressure' (Knapp 1985) ;
'an attitude/state of mind ' (Schuetze 1994) ; 'a function of character with the integrity and trustworthiness being key' (Magill and Previts 1991 • pre-conventional -where the individual places self-interest well above the common interests of society and is sensitive to penalty attributes; • conventional -where the individual conforms to the rules of society and is sensitive to affiliation attributes; and • post-conventional -where the individual forms a judgement conforming to ethical principles and not to society's rules.
The findings of an experimental study using 119 audit partners and managers show that a systematic relationship between auditors' measured ethical cognition and hypothetical and audit conflict scenarios and their resolution of an independence conflict exists. (This in later confirmed in a study by Sweeney and Roberts (1997) ). They also found that independence judgements are significantly influenced by factors relating to penalty and are less sensitive to affiliation factors (i.e. living up to what is expected by people).
Windsor and Ashkanasy (1995) extend Ponemon and Gabhart's (1990) study by including economic and personal belief variables, in particular client management bargaining power and belief in a just world, in addition to the level of moral reasoning development. Three styles of auditor decision-making emerged:
• autonomous -auditors who were responsive to personal beliefs and were more likely to resist client management power;
• accommodating -auditors who responded to both personal beliefs and client management power and who were least resistant to client management pressure; and • pragmatic -auditors who were responsive to client management power, irrespective of beliefs.
These three styles correspond to individuals with high, mid, and low levels of moral reasoning, respectively.
The contingent influence of organisational culture, i.e., the moral atmosphere of the audit firm, is also being explored by researchers, although no clear results have yet emerged (Ashkanasy and Windsor, 1997; Sweeney and Roberts, 1997) . Ponemon and Gabhart (1990) also find a systematic relationship between ethical cognition and auditors' priority rankings of factors influencing auditor independence. In particular, subjects at the preconventional level of ethical cognition ranked freedom from pressure to retain client and existence of legal liability significantly higher than subjects at the conventional level. Falk et al. (1999) find, in an experiment carried out with students, that the biggest threat to independent behaviour is the risk of losing a client. This is consistent with Beattie et al. (1999) 
Earnings Management
Pressures on management to engage in aggressive earnings management in order to improve results can intensify the pressure on auditors. The APB (2001) is concerned that fraudulent reporting can result where earnings expectations cannot be delivered. The APB asks whether UK Auditing Standards should explicitly require auditors to identify pressures on management to deliver results, and to plan how to respond. In one of the very few studies which questions auditors' about their actual behaviour, Nelson et al. (2000) survey US audit partners, and find that auditors are able to prevent earnings management attempts (EMAs) in many cases. In certain circumstances, however, they may waive EMAs. These circumstances are where EMAs: decrease current period income; are governed by imprecise standards or are structured around precise standards (i.e. demonstrate creative compliance as described by McBarnet and Whelan (1991) ; are viewed as immaterial; or, are attempted by large clients. Although not specifically seeking evidence of earnings management, Beattie et al. (2000) find evidence, by surveying AEPs and FDs, of the frequency and subject matter of discussions and negotiations between both parties and many of the issues identified impact on reported earnings. While they find evidence that the auditor does influence financial reporting outcomes, the degree of independence exerted cannot be evaluated.
THREATS AND SAFEGUARDS IDENTIFIED BY THE UK AND IFAC
FRAMEWORKS
The UK framework identifies threats and safeguards to objectivity. Subsequent frameworks issued by the EC (2001) The UK framework identifies safeguards against independence threats which the IFAC framework expands and classifies as: those created by the profession (the practice environment); those created by legislation or regulation (regulatory safeguards and sanctions); and those involving third parties (client's audit committees, regulatory bodies or another firm). A fourth, ultimate, safeguard is the right to refuse to act. Table 1 lists the safeguards as shown in both frameworks. (They are matched against each other only in terms of generic source.) It may be observed that the UK framework refers at length to personal qualities and risks to individuals. IFAC goes into much more detail about the nature of safeguards within audit firms, describing firm-wide safeguards and engagement-specific safeguards. IFAC also describes safeguards within the audit client particularly focussing on audit committees and corporate governance whereas the UK framework makes little reference to this.
Table 1 about here
Although the appearance and fact of independence are distinguished in the definitions, importantly, the threats and safeguards do not indicate whether the fact or the appearance of independence is being addressed. Table 2 sets out the detailed threats and safeguards in the UK framework and highlights key additions made to these in the IFAC proposals.
We classify safeguards as either 'regulatory prohibitions' or 'other safeguards'. IFAC sets out in detail the practice environment safeguards as identified in Table 1 so these have not been repeated in full in Table 2 . They are referred to as 'practice environment safeguards'. The additional IFAC proposals are shown in bold italics.
Table 2 about here
From Table 2 it may be observed that the self-interest threat provides the largest number of detailed threats and prohibitions. One fundamental threat is not addressed -the underlying fear of losing the client. It may also be observed that intimidation is the threat which has the least prohibitions and other safeguards attached to it. We argue that threats which are subject to prohibitions are no longer threats either to independence in appearance or independence in fact. It is the threats which are not subject to prohibitions where the risks lie. These are: fear of losing the client; non-audit services; low fees; supporting the clients' interests; former partner working for the client; and intimidation.
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERACTIONS IN BCD
What BCD is about
In BCD, Beattie et al. (2001) The outcomes are found to be influenced by a complex, interacting set of contextual factors, such as the level of integrity of the AEP, the quality of the primary relationship between the FD and the AEP, the company type and situation, the effectiveness of corporate governance, the clarity of accounting rules on the issue, and the level of audit firm support and quality control. Although many of these factors have been identified and studied separately in previous research, they have not previously been addressed as embedded within the real-life process of interaction between FDs and AEPs which ultimately leads to the production of a company's annual report and accounts.
Conclusions are drawn from the empirical evidence in the case studies about how the incentives and behaviour of both directors and auditors influence the outcome of interactions. The key factor in judging an outcome is whether it fully complies with the regulatory framework or falls short, either through non-compliance or creative compliance.
From the company perspective, much is found to depend on the clarity of standards and on management's attitude to earnings quality. Management may be motivated to manage earnings by specific pressures, such as debt covenants, declining performance or the threat of a takeover. 3 Companies with a status and reputation to protect may be more cautious about engaging in aggressive accounting but may still do so if the motivation is sufficiently strong. It is found that compliance with corporate governance requirements does not necessarily guarantee good financial reporting outcomes. Ownership structure and the existence of a dominant chief executive can outweigh such safeguards.
From the audit firm's perspective, much can similarly depend on the clarity of standards, the materiality of the issue involved, and the sanctions available to the auditor and the company. The main sanction for the auditor is a qualified audit report or withdrawal from the assignment, and for the company, replacement of the auditor.
Three key factors from within the audit firm emerge as having significant influence on the quality of outcomes to interactions. The first factor is the personality of the individual partner (or partner type). Four partner types are identified from the cases and two more are hypothesised to exist. Those identified are: crusaders, safe pairs of hands, trusters and accommodators. Those hypothesised to exist are incompetents and rogues. The underlying driver of behaviour for an AEP is found to be the individual level of professional integrity. The second factor is the effectiveness of quality control procedures, broadly defined, within the audit firm. These procedures include recruitment, partner selection, technical support, back-up, training, evaluation and reward procedures, hot review and, critically, the matching of partner types to clients. The unhappy consequences of allocating an inexperienced partner to a company with a dominant chief executive who has a controlling interest in the company are amply shown by the evidence in BCD. The third factor is the quality of the primary relationship, i.e. the relationship between the FD and the AEP. A good primary relationship where both parties have high ethical standards is found to have a positive influence on quality of outcomes.
How the interactions in BCD relate to the IFAC and UK independence frameworks
The analysis in BCD focuses on the key influences emanating from within the company, within the audit firm and the primary relationship which affect the outcome of each interaction. BCD therefore provides a comprehensive analysis of the influences which affect the quality of each outcome analysed. In this paper, we shift perspective and analyse the independence dimensions associated with each outcome. It is worth emphasising that, as all these outcomes are factual events, the analysis relates to issues associated with independence in fact, not independence in appearance, and only concerns influences which are not subject to the absolute prohibitions set out in Table 2 . The overall independence threats and safeguards in the IFAC independence framework (the safeguards are set out on the right hand column of Table 1 ) provide the analytical framework within which the interactions are examined. The IFAC framework for safeguards is used rather than the UK framework as it is more recent and is likely to be more widely applied. The threats are the same in both UK and IFAC frameworks. The interactions analysed are given the same identities as in BCD and are in respect of the six companies: NS plc, TJ plc, MP plc, CRA plc, RC plc and DA plc. Table 3 summarises the 22 financial reporting interactions indicating the subject of the negotiation and the relevant threats and available safeguards as identified in the IFAC framework. The final two columns evaluate the effectiveness of the safeguard and report the final outcome of the interaction. Where an interaction involves a threat which is not specifically identified in the IFAC framework, this is shown in bold and underlined under the heading 'nature of threat'. (For more details regarding the interaction issues and the negotiation process see BCD). The wider regulatory safeguards contained in the UK framework are not included in Table 3 , since they apply to every outcome. They could, however, have a significant influence on behaviour. These safeguards include the UK's system of monitoring the work of audit firms, disciplinary action by the profession, and enforcement role of the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) which publicises cases where directors were required by the FRRP to correct defects in their accounts. The principal safeguard against bullying, which is not clearly articulated in the framework, is linked to the personal characteristics of the AEP and his ability to stand up to this form of intimidation (MP2). A further safeguard is the audit firm's partner selection procedures which should ensure that only robust individuals become audit partners. The safeguard against intimidation accompanied by threats of removal lies within the firm's quality control procedures and is a self-interest threat both to the firm and the individual partner. A further safeguard may come from within the corporate governance of the company (DA5), but corporate governance per se cannot be assumed to be a safeguard. A poor corporate governance structure, for example a dominant chief executive, or an aggressive management incentive scheme, can increase rather than diminish the threat to independence.
The motivations for intimidation are not addressed in the IFAC framework. APB (2001) identifies various motivations for directors wanting to report certain results, but a further motivation emerges from this analysis which is face saving. Directors may intimidate auditors to avoid disclosing or reporting events that show them to have made poor business decisions (MP1a, RC2).
While the examples given of threats in the IFAC framework are not intended to be comprehensive, they do not include some of the threats that arise in BCD. Three further examples of the self-review threat emerge from the analysis which we suggest should be included in the framework. First, an AEP gives wrong advice himself and then has to change position (TJ3). Second, the auditor overlooks a technical point and it is picked up by a technical review within the firm (DA4). (The safeguard against these two events is technical competence, both from the AEP personally and from within the firm.) Third, an AEP disagrees with an interpretation provided by a previous auditor (MP1). The safeguard against this lies in the regulatory framework, and within the firm's own ability to convince the client of the need for change.
Another serious threat to independence, which is not addressed by IFAC (2001), emerges from the self-review threat, but is not necessarily a precursor to it. This is the urgency threat. This can arise when issues emerge at a late stage, either as a result of audit procedures or from events within the company. Auditors find themselves under greater pressure and subject to intimidation to reach agreement rapidly on an issue when the reporting date approaches (DA4, TJ3). The safeguard against this lies within the quality control procedures of the firm and the ability of the individual partner to resist pressure.
Other less obvious examples of the familiarity threat also appear. Reference is made in IFAC (2001) to the situation where a partner in a firm moves to a client. The risks inherent in this situation emerge throughout TJ plc, but a more interesting example appears in RC plc where the FD had been senior to the AEP when they both worked for the same firm. Any previous relationship between an FD and an AEP clearly has the potential to influence the interactions between them and must be considered a familiarity threat. It is interesting that in both Waste Management case (SEC 2001) and at Enron, a significant number of senior staff within the company were formerly employed by the auditors. IFAC recognises this problem as an intimidation threat. Interestingly, the EC framework, which has recently been adopted as best practice in the UK, disbars an engagement partner from joining a client within two years of leaving the audit firm.
There are no examples in our cases of the advocacy threat.
Discussion of findings
Where the outcome of an interaction is fully compliant with the regulatory framework, the audit firm may be perceived to have achieved independence in respect of that specific interaction. Most of the interactions in our analysis show fully compliant outcomes and in these cases where auditors came under pressure from management, the safeguards in place have been sufficient to neutralise the threats.
We identify three types of unsatisfactory outcome: first, an accounting treatment with which the AEP did not concur but which was not a breach of UK GAAP (CRA3, CRA5); second, creative compliance with which the AEP concurred (TJ2, TJ3); and third, a clearly identified breach of the framework (TJ1, RC2) with which the AEP concurred. In CRA3 and CRA5, the outcomes were not as the auditor wished. Although he and his firm behaved independently, he had no support from the regulatory framework or from safeguards within the company to enforce his wishes. The option of a qualified audit report was not considered feasible because the issues were not a regulatory breach and
were not material to the overall accounts.
In TJ2 and TJ3 the partner encouraged the company to engage in creative compliance.
Also in TJ plc there was an outright breach of the framework in the overvaluation of stock (TJ1). In this case, the partner lacked independence as he knowingly permitted poor quality accounting. However in the TJ plc interactions, there are more threats to independence in each interaction than in any of the other cases, and the safeguards are much weaker. The safeguards within the company provide no support for the auditor and the firm's own procedures are not effective. Added to this there is an inexperienced, newly appointed partner.
In the other case where there is a breach (RC2) the company is large and fairly conservative. The partner's lack of independence in this case is more difficult to explain.
It may be linked to the findings of Nelson et al. (2000) that auditors are more inclined to waive earnings management in larger companies where there may be less overall risk.
BCD classifies this partner as a truster because he believes that the client is safe.
Interestingly, the familiarity threat only arises in the two cases where the partners lack independence. One is classified as a truster and the other as an accommodator. The more robust partners are not likely to be influenced by such relationships.
Although all the outcomes in TJ plc are poor, as the partner gave way to intimidation, only one outcome in RC plc is poor. The others fully comply with the regulatory framework. The poor outcome was not visible from the published accounts. This partner would not allow the client to get away with observable non-compliance which could be picked up from the published accounts by the Financial Reporting Review Panel, which investigates visible cases of non-compliance in companies. He was, however, prepared to condone non-compliance which was not visible.
Another factor which emerges strongly is the varying degrees of pressure put on AEPs by management according to management's motivation. This is particularly evident in NS3, TJ3 and MP2. In NS3 and TJ3 the matter was important to the chairman, and in MP3 it was important to a senior director. In CRA5 the auditor was not under pressure because management simply refused to co-operate, knowing the matter was not material overall.
In any one audit outcomes may vary, and it may be much more difficult to achieve a good outcome depending on the pressures put on the AEP by management. It is therefore critical for auditors to understand fully management motivation in relation to each specific issue, as well as taking an overall view of the risk profile of the client.
IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS
Revisiting the frameworks
We identify no examples of the advocacy threat in our case studies, as instances of advocacy do not arise from the interactions. The cases deal with the fact, not the appearance, of independence and how lack of independence in fact can lead to poor financial reporting outcomes.
Threats to the integrity of the audit process arise from auditors allowing clients to get away with poor financial reporting outcomes, i.e. lack of independence in fact.
Unfortunately, these threats to independence in fact are muddled up in the framework with the problems of independence in appearance, particularly with regard to three key threats, self-interest, familiarity and self-review. Most independence frameworks (including the UK and IFAC) already disbar the obvious conflicts of interest which would undermine the appearance of independence and which could also, but not necessarily, undermine independence in fact if the safeguards were not adequately applied. These are: direct financial interest in a client (self-interest threat); a close friend or relative being involved in the management of a client (familiarity threat); and, involvement in the management of a client (self-review threat). Where an audit partner and a firm operated at the highest levels of integrity, even these threats need not undermine independence in fact, although the appearance would be unacceptable.
Two threats, intimidation and familiarity, which are already identified in the framework emerge from our analysis as key threats to good outcomes. Intimidation encompasses bullying, the threat of dismissal or both. The threat of dismissal is the fundamental selfinterest threat for an auditor as it leads to economic loss and loss of face for the firm and very probably for the partner as well. The existence of a former relationship between the FD and the AEP in which the FD was dominant emerges as a key feature of the familiarity threat and this can also lead to intimidation.
Other issues emerge from our analysis which are not explicitly identified in the framework but which we believe need to be recognised. First, it is fundamental that the motivation of management is understood by the auditor in respect of specific issues as this can drive the intensity of intimidation threats. Second, urgency and face saving are not recognised as threats and the evidence indicates them to be significant. Third, the adequacy of a firm's own procedures is critical to the quality of outcomes, as are the personal attributes and level of moral reasoning of the individual partners. Fourth, poor quality or aggressive management also represents a threat. Fifth, the adequacy of the regulatory framework is also a key influence.
The IFAC framework assumes reliance on the audit firm and the company's corporate governance as factors which represent safeguards to independence. These factors, and the moral development and personal qualities of the individual partners can also be threats and need to be recognised as such. A particular concern for any audit firm must be the risk that a partner will put his own interests before those of the firm or that, as in the case of MP2, not all partners will support the stand taken by a partner where it could lead to the loss of a major client. A further risk for a firm is that an inappropriate partner is allocated to a client. TJ plc is an example of risks of this type where a newly promoted partner was allocated to a client where the CEO/chairman was known to be a bully and also had a controlling interest in the company.
We argue that obvious conflicts of interest, which are already the subject of prohibitions, should be clearly distinguished in the frameworks from threats which are not the subject of prohibitions and have to be managed. Being already prohibited the former class of threat cannot undermine independence in fact. The threats which remain relate to selfinterest, intimidation and to a limited extent, familiarity. The self-interest threats are the risk of losing the client, low fees, the provision of other non-prohibited services and identifying too closely with the client. The intimidation threats are bullying by the client and the problems of former partners or senior staff from the firm being employed by the client. All these threats have to be addressed from within the firm's own procedures, subject obviously to regulatory requirements and external oversight.
Our findings indicate that the frameworks do not explicitly set out how fundamental threats to independence in fact should be managed. A further key problem which is not explicitly addressed in the framework is that of partner selection, i.e. ensuring that partners have the personal attributes to be able to stand up to difficult clients, given appropriate support within the firm.
Revisiting the risk model
On the basis that obvious conflicts of interest should be addressed before a client is taken on by a firm, our thesis, based on the analysis presented in this paper, is that independence in fact and independence in appearance should be conceptually de-coupled and that independence in fact should be factored into the audit risk model. Audit risk is defined as the risk that the firm will give an inappropriate opinion, and the risk model underpins the concept of audit quality. But the model stops at detection risk, i.e the point at which the firm identifies a problem. Identifying a problem does not mean that an appropriate opinion will be given. If the firm or partner lacks independence in fact for whatever reason, they may not deal properly with issues which emerge during the audit and an inappropriate opinion may be given. As well as arising in the BCD examples, this problem is also apparent in the Waste Management case (SEC 2001) . A further issue for the risk model emerges to a limited extent in TJ3 where wrong advice was given. We suggest that poor quality technical advice, given in a current year, also increases independence risk because it may generate late adjustments and the subsequent urgency increases intimidation. We believe that the risk model should be extended to add the additional risk of the firm failing to deal properly with issues which emerged. The failure to recognise the significance of issues which have been detected during the audit is a competence risk, which does not emerge from this study but which is referred to by Hall and Renner (1991). Without these risks the model does not properly address the risk of the auditor giving a wrong opinion.
In addition to the inclusion of independence and competence risk into the risk model, we also suggest that the model should be divided explicitly into the risks which arise from the client and the risks that arise from the firm in order to reflect the way in which the independence framework recognises the safeguards. In terms of the client based risk this should include motivation risk as this is key to the understanding of directors' behaviour.
We also break down the risk to specific periods and transactions to recognise that the auditor may be subject to more pressure in specific accounting periods, and in relation to specific transactions depending on management motivation. Our revised risk model is shown as Figure 2 . It is also suggested that the conflicts of interest and other threats to independence which are the subject of prohibitions should be treated separately in the framework, so that the management of key threats and safeguards which undermine independence in fact, (i.e provision of other services, fees, the risk of losing the client, intimidation and bullying, and former senior staff in the audit firm holding senior positions within a client) are more rigorously addressed. 
Refusal to act where no other course available.
The perception of the public that auditors' objectivity may be threatened is not of itself a reason to refuse appointment.
Note 1:The requirements for monitoring independence, consulting on difficult issues and compliance reviews are a requirement of the UK audit regulations compliance with which is assessed as part of the legally required monitoring procedures. Non-compliance can result in restriction or loss of license to audit. More than 15% total recurring fees from one client or 10% from listed or other public interest client forbidden. No level set for prohibition.
AEP to review with 2 nd partner support: where income is >10% for any client or >5% for listed or public interest client; where one office or one partner is dependent on one client for income.
b. Loans to or from a client; overdue fees; guarantees for debts.
Loans and guarantees forbidden, except financial institutions in normal course of business.
Principal in AF to review overdue fees to establish if it constitutes a loan. 
Family and personal relationships (also recognised as familiarity and intimidation threats).
Partner prohibited from acting if he is an officer or employee of the client, or a partner or employee of such a person (in UK prohibited by s.27 1989 Companies Act); no-one in AF should be involved in the audit if employed by client within two previous years; may not act as company secretary.
No one on audit team should have close family member in a position to influence audit. Prohibited except for insurance policies, pensions or investment trusts.
Self-interest threat identified
Prohibited.
Prohibited.
AF has beneficial interests in shares or trusts holding shares in clients, or firm's pension fund has shares in clients.
1.Self-interest: continued
Member of the audit team or immediate/ close family member of the audit team has material interest in an audit client.
If immediate family member remove individual from audit team.
Practice environment safeguards.
i. Trusteeships, nominee holdings and bare trusts holding shares in clients.
Prohibited for AF or closely connected person where trust holds > 10% shares in public interest company. In other cases trustee may not act as engagement partner. Prohibited where trustee a beneficiary of the trust; where the interest is material; where the trust exercises significant influence over the client; where there is significant influence over investment decisions. No employee should be used on any audit who would be excluded from the role of auditor.
Other conflicts left to the firm to identify and decide upon.
l. Provision of non-audit services (NAS) to audit clients (also a selfreview threat, see 2.a below).
Holding or exercising authority on behalf of the audit client; preparing source documents or originating data evidencing the occurrence of a transaction; determining which recommendation of the AF should be implemented; reporting in a management role to those charged with governance.
Holding custody of client's assets; supervising client employees in their normal activities.
Total fee including NAS must not be > 10% for public interest companies or 15% for others.
No limit set.
Prohibited.
AF to review with 2 nd partner support: where income is >10% for any client or >5% for listed or public interest client; where one office or dependent on one client for income. Discuss with audit committee. Practice environment safeguards.
m. Fee quoted is lower than charged by other firms.
None.
AF must demonstrate that appropriate staff and time assigned to client and all regulatory requirements adhered to.
1.Self-interest: continued n. Contingency fees.
Also advocacy threat.
Prohibited for audit work, reporting assignments, due diligence and similar non-audit roles incorporating professional opinions and expert witness assignments.
Prohibited for audit work or fees which form part of the audit engagement.
Discuss with audit committee. Practice environment safeguards. Practice environment safeguards. AF to ensure any advice given is accepted by directors as their own judgments. AF to decide whether expert second opinion needed where AF designs systems affecting operations on which commercial success of company depends.
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b. Acting for a prolonged period of time.
Audit partner prohibited from acting for listed company audit for >7years. May not take on role again for 5 years (but not precluded from other involvement with client). Safeguards not effective; no safeguards in company. firm's own procedures did not adequately enforce framework.
Chairman agreed to write off stock but only over three years; noncompliance with regulatory framework because accounting policy as stated was not followed and SSAP 9 breached. Correct treatment adopted. 
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